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Now You See It - Now You Don't: Intervivos
Gifts in the Commonwealth Caribbean
If ever a breach of the law called for reform it is the law relat-
ing to estate duty. It ought to be certain: it ought to be sensible
-it is neither.1
One of the less sensible areas of estate duty law in the Commonwealth
Caribbean concerns the valuation of gifts made inter vivos. It is a stand-
ard part of estate duty legislation that gifts made within a certain period
before the death in question should be deemed to have remained part of
the estate, and to have passed on the death of the donor. The relevant
period varies within the Commonwealth Caribbean,2 but the object is of
course the same-to prevent the avoidance of estate duty by means of gifts
made prior to death.
Commonly, this type of legislation provides that the property given
within the relevant time period should be valued, for the purposes of as-
sessing the estate duty payable, at the time of the death of the donor. It
therefore follows that if the property is worthless or no longer exists at
this time, no duty can be levied in respect of it.
Pinson states that this "facilitated the avoidance of estate duty by
what came to be called the 'disappearing trick'."' 3 Another writer, Mor-
com refers to the "Dead Horse Scheme," whereby the gifted property dis-
appeared and reappeared in other forms, such as "redeemable stock."4 This
name was suggested by the fact that the classic example of the "disappear-
ing trick" was that of a gift of a racehorse which died before its donor.
The racehorse having disappeared, no duty was payable.
5
It is apparent from the foregoing that there are various possibilities:
(I) The gifted property may just become completely worth-
less, as where the horse died. This can only happen
where it is inherent in the nature of the gift that it can
disappear of its own accord;
(II) the property may become less valuable - a partial dis-
appearance. The horse has been put out to pasture or
shares have declined in value, for example;
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(11) the property has disappeared and reappeared in another
form, as in the example given by Morcom. This is really
another version of (1), since the property, in its original
form, has become worthless. In other words, the horse has
been reincarnated. The question which the law must an-
swer is whether estate duty can be levied on the value
of the reincarnated horse.
A recent Barbadian decision, In the matter o1 the Estate of Webster6
has provided an excellent illustration of the "Dead Horse Scheme" in ac-
tion, in this case the dead horse being debentures which were reincarnated
in the form of shares prior to the death the donor.
The donor and subsequent deceased, Mr. Webster, was the owner of
four separate properties on the island of Barbados. A company was incor-
porated under the name of Moncrieffe Ltd., and the following day Mr.
Webster sold these properties to the company for the sum of BD$150,000,
which was satisfied by the issue of debentures in favour of certain of his
relatives. These relatives, Mr. Webster's son and three grand-children, later
became the petitioners in these proceedings.
Approximately one month after the debentures had been issued, they
were converted into shares in the company, and, again approximately one
month later, Mr. Webster died. In assessing estate and succession duties
on his estate, the Commissioner included the $150,000 as gifts inter vivos.
The petitioners appealed to the High Court against this assessment.
The position is governed by section 7 of the Estate and Succession
Duties Act, 1941, which states that property passing on a death shall be
deemed to include, inter alia,
(d) property taken as a donatio mortis causa made by the de-
ceased or taken under a disposition made by him purporting to
operate as an immediate gift inter vivos, whether by way of
transfer, delivery declaration of trust, or otherwise, which shall
not have been bona fide made three years before his death...7
The gift of the debentures clearly came within this section, as the
deceased had died nearly immediately afterwards.
However, section 14(1) of the 1941 Act states-
The principal value of any property shall be estimated to be the
price which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, such property
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would fetch if sold in the open market at the time of the death
of the deceased.9
The argument for the petitioners was simple. Since the property in
question was the debentures, and the debentures had been surrendered,
they were worthless at the time of the death and therefore it was not pos-
sible within the terms of the Act to levy duty in respect of them.
Property which is the subject-matter of a gift must be valued at the
time of the death, irrespective of who then owns it.
For example:
X gives Y a diamond ring. Y sells it for $100. X dies within the
relevant period and at the time of his death the ring is valued
at $200. Estate duty is payable on $200.
The question in Webster was whether the debentures could be traced
into the shares, and duty levied on the value of the value of the shares
accordingly.
In support of his argument that this was not permissible, counsel for
the petitioners cited the House of Lords case of Sneddon v. Lord Ad-
vocate,9 which turned on the construction of what was then identical legis-
lation in the United Kingdom, sections 2(1) (c) and 7(5) of the Finance
Act, 1894. In Sneddon, the deceased had paid the sum of £5,000 to trus-
tees with directions to hold and apply the same "or investments represent-
ing the same" on certain trusts. The trustees bought some shares which
were worth £9,250 at the date of the death. The majority of the House
of Lords held that the relevant sum for the purposes of estate duty was
the £5,000 and not £9,250. Lord Reid made the following crucial state.
ment.
I find myself unable to regard, say, securities received from the
donor and sold as the same property as other securities which
have been bought with the proceeds of the sale of the first. 10
Counsel was certainly correct in citing Sneddon as support for his
argument, since it did in fact change the practice which had pertained
in the United Kingdom during the previous year.
In July, 1953, the Commissioners had issued a statement that they
had been advised that where the gifted property had changed in form,
duty could be levied on the proceeds of the sale of the property of invest-
ments representing them.11 The advice was based, on S.22(1) (f) of the
Finance Act, 1894, under which "property" was described as including
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"the proceeds and sale thereof." As Dymond succinctly says, "(t),his prac-
tice was short-lived;". 12 Following Sneddon, in March, 1954, the Commis-
sioners issued the following statement:
In future, the Estate Duty in respect of property taken under a
disposition purporting to operate as a gift inter vivos will be
regarded as imposed upon the property originally given... in
this context the word 'property' will not be given the extended
meaning assigned to it by S.22(1) (f) of the Finance Act, 1894.13
Sneddon was also accepted by the High Court of Australia in the
case of Gale v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation,14 in which that court
declined to say that a gift or settlement of money inter vivos should be
treated as the money or property into which such gift can be traced at
the time of the death. In other words there is no power to follow the
money or property into the form it has then taken.
As the Chief Justice pointed out in Webster, the assessment of estate
duty necessitates two things:
(I) The ascertainment of the subject-matter of the gift; and
(II) ' the valuation of that subject-matter at the time of the
death of the donor.
5
With reference to the first point, the Crown argued in the following
way. The petitioners had freely substituted something for the property
which they had been given, in that they had changed debentures for
shares. This was a change in name and form only and did not "affect
the substance of the transaction." In re O'Brien; Little v. O'Brien16 was
referred to in support of this argument, but this was a case on .the con-
struction of a will, made by a testator who had directed his trustees to
hold some shares in a named company on certain trusts. After his death
the company allotted him further ordinary shares as bonus shares and
divided the ordinary shares into preferred ordinary and deferred ordinary
shares of smaller denomination. It was held that the original shares could
be traced into the preferred and deferred ordinary shares, as they had
changed in name and form only.
The' Chief Justice dealt at some length with this "attractive" argu-
ment: His main objection was that different canons of construction apply
to Wills and taxing statutes. On the one hand, a will must be construed
so as to reflect the intention of the testator, while a statute imposing a
tax must be strictly construed.
17
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Undoubtedly, the principle underlying the estate duty legislation
is that a person should be prevented from avoiding death duty
on some part of his estate by giving it away within a stated pe-
riod of his death. However this may be, the statute must be con-
strued strictly and regard must be had solely to the words of the
Act.
18
Here, his Lordship was in fact echoing the well-known words of Row-
latt, J., in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C.19
In a taxing Act, one has to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about
a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read
in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the
language used.
20
Further, the argument already mentioned, that the definition of the
word "property" 21 enabled the shares to be treated as representing the
debentures, was rejected by Douglas, C. J., on the authority of Sneddon.
This definition could not apply to property to be ascertained at a par-
ticular moment in time-a phraseology emanating from Sneddon itself.
The provision is not a definition of 'property'; it only provides
that 'property' is to have an extended meaning and include 'pro-
ceeds of sale,' etc., unless the context otherwise requires. It is
really applicable where the Act is dealing with the holding of
property for a period, but it appears to be inapplicable where the
Act is dealing with property to be ascertained at a particular
moment of time. If one is looking for property passing or taken
at a particular time, the proceeds of a subsequent sale cannot
have passed or been taken at that time because they did not then
exist. I therefore think that this provision is excluded by the
context here; 22
However, the decisive factor for the Chief Justice appeared to be the
absence of any specific statutory power to trace. In the United Kingdom
the "disappearing trick" itself disappeared, the magic words being S.38
of the Finance Act 1957. While not affecting the situation where the
property had ceased to exist in any form, in other words, where the horse
had died, this section provided the necessary power to trace property into
money or other property representing it.
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Section (38) (1) provides as follows:
Where property comprised in a gift inter vivos (being neither
property settled by the gift, nor a sum of money in sterling or
any other currency) is (treated for purposes of estate duty as
passing) on the death of the donor, and at some time before the
death the donee has ceased to have the possession and enjoyment
of any of the property so comprised, then subject to the provision
of this section the enactments relating to estate duty in respect
of gifts inter vivos (including this section) shall apply as if the
property, if any, received by the donee in substitute for that
property had been comprised in the gift instead of that property
(but in addition to any other property so comprised).
23
His Lordship therefore concluded that the second question-what
was the value of the subject-matter of the gift-must be answered on the
basis that the debentures had no value whatsoever.
While the logic of the decision is unassailable, an obvious and com-
monplace question immediately springs to mind-where does one draw
the line? Arguably the decision could mean that a cheque cashed before
the death of the donor would not attract estate duty. This possibility was
alluded to by one leading British tax lawyer, just prior to the amending
legislation.
So long as the decision in Sneddon v. Lord Advocate is not al-
tered by subsequent legislation . -. , duty will be escaped so long
as the settlor lives until the original settled property has become
valueless. Thus a debenture which is shortly afterwards repaid,
or shares in a building society which are redeemed, or even, pos-
sibly, a banker's draft which is quickly cashed, may be utilized
as the original property to be settled with a view to avoiding
duty on the settlor's death.
24
The unrealistic distinction between a cheque and the money which
it represents is of course known to the law. In Sibree v. Tripp2 5 it was
held that a debt could be satisfied for a negotiable security for a lesser
amount. The form of the payment introduced a new element. This case
was followed in Goddard v. O'Brien,26 in which a cheque for £100 was
held to satisfy a debt for £125.7.9. The distinction has naturally been
critised, by Cheshire and Fifoot among others.
'This device is technically sound. But in contemporary society
- the distinction between payment in cash and payment by cheque
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-provided indeed that the cheque is honoured-scarcely accords
with business practice.
2 7
In the more recent decision of D and C Builders Ltd. v. Rees,
28
the English Court of Appeal overruled Goddard v. O'Brien and refused
to recognise the distinction.
Barbados is not the only Commonwealth Caribbean country to have
neglected to introduce the necessary amending legislation. 29 The Webster
situation could arise in Trinidad and Tobago, 30 Grenada,
31 Dominica,32
St. Vincent, 33 Montserrat, 34 St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, 35 Antigua, 36 and St.
Lucia.3
7
Guyana 38 and Belize, 39 are possible exceptions. In Guyana, S.9(1) (b)
of the Estate Duty Act deals with gifts inter vivos in terms similar to the
relevant provisions in the Barbadian legislation. But there are two im-
portant differences:
Firstly "property," is described in S.9 itself and there is an ex-
press statement that the definition is for the purposes of that section.
The term 'property' as used in this section includes immovable
and movable property, rights and effects of any kind having
their seat in Guyana, and the proceeds of sale thereof, and any
investment for the time being representing them...
Secondly, there is no equivalent statement that the property must be
valued as on the open market at the time of the death of the donor.
The combination of these two factors may well preclude a decision
like Webster being reached, since it would be very difficult to disregard
the express wording of the definition subsection. On the other hand, the
Guyanese legislation is silent as to when the property should be valued,
which may well create different problems.
One is inclined to prefer the preciseness of the British resolution to
the problem. It is difficult to understand why it has not already been
emulated within the Caribbean, assuming, of course, that the maximiza-
tion of estate duty is perceived as desirable.
There is yet another possible approach, one suggested by a recent
Australian decision, mentioned by Ford.
40
It was held by the Board of Review that changes referable to the
inherent nature of the property given were to be taken into account for
estate duty purposes, but not other changes. Here the subject-matter of
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the gift was debentures which were redeemed in cash before the death of
the donor. This money was held to be dutiable on the ground that it was
referable to the nature of the debentures been sold.
41
This approach would certainly cover the possibility of a cheque be-
ing used as the original settled property. Clearly the money received for
a cheque is referable to the inherent nature of the cheque! Whether the
approach suggested would cover Webster is more dubious, and here it
might be useful to draw a distinction between debentures which are ex-
pressly stated to be convertible and debentures which are not. We are not
told anything about the nature of the debentures in Webster itself. It is
unlikely that it would have made any difference, but the point might be
taken in the future, and it is suggested that a debenture which is not
expressly convertible is preferable, ex abundanti cautela, from the point
of view of the estate, rather than the Inland Revenue.
From the point of view of the Inland Revenue, amending legislation
is urgently necessary. The device is a relatively simple one, which, if used
frequently, would result in a drastic decrease in revenue collected under
the estate duty legislation.
CHRISTINE BOYLE
LL.B., LL.M., of the Inn of Court of N. Ireland
Barrister at Law
Lecturer, University of the West Indies
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